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THE AFTERMATH OF MATAL V. TAM: UNANSWERED 
QUESTIONS AND EARLY APPLICATIONS 
Andrew M. Lehmkuhl II 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Seven applications to register a trademark for the N-word were filed 
since June 19, 2017.1 Similar applications were filed for the swastika 
symbol.2 Prior to that date, a provision of the federal statute governing 
trademark registration (The Lanham Act) expressly made federal 
registration unavailable for disparaging terms or symbols.3 In the 
landmark decision in Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court held that this ban 
on disparaging trademarks violated the First Amendment as an 
unconstitutional restriction on free speech.4  
Many questions remain following the decision in Tam. Primarily, 
clear guidance does not exist for whether similar trademark subject 
prohibitions included in the Lanham Act also violate the First 
Amendment as an unconstitutional abridgement of speech. Additionally, 
significant questions arise as to the level of First Amendment 
involvement in the statutory bans on federal registration of certain 
trademarks. However, while careful consideration confirms indirect 
First Amendment implication, these statutory prohibitions still would 
not survive the rational basis review that would be afforded otherwise. 
Regardless of the remaining questions involving trademark law and 
the First Amendment, the decision in Tam will have broad resounding 
effects in other areas of government registration. Early applications and 
adherence of the analysis set forth in Tam show that District Courts and 
Circuit Courts alike are applying the Tam holding in other cases 
involving government registration programs that fall outside of the 
umbrella of trademark law.  
II. BACKGROUND 
This section will first provide an overview of the history of trademark 
law and the development of the Lanham Act, primarily Section 2(a) 
which prohibited trademark registration for disparaging terms. Next, this 
section will introduce Simon Tam and his band the Slants, and briefly 
 
 1. Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Leads to Offensive Trademark Requests, Reuters 
(June 23, 2017), https://goo.gl/Xv4Sr8; NIGGA, Registration No. 87496454.  
 2. Id; Swastika, Registration No. 87503998.  
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  
 4. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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summarize Tam’s initial dispute over Section 2(a). Finally, this section 
will summarize and provide relevant highlights from the Supreme 
Court’s holding and analysis in Matal v. Tam. 
A. Trademark Law and the Lanham Act 
Trademarks consist of words, names, symbols, or devices that a 
person uses to identify and distinguish his or her goods or services from 
those manufactured, sold, or otherwise provided by others.5 In the 
simplest sense, trademarks are designed to identify the source of goods 
or services, and may be commonly understood as a brand.6 The use of 
trademark has deep historical underpinnings, and modern trademark law 
presents an interesting dynamic between state and federal law, as well as 
statutory and common law.  
Trademarks have been widely used for centuries, dating back as long 
as the origins of commerce itself.7 Archaeologists excavating ancient 
Egyptian sites have discovered building bricks imprinted with the names 
of the manufacturers.8 Asian ceramics produced in approximately 2700 
B.C. carried marks indicating the name of their maker or their place of 
origin.9 Humans are naturally competitive, so temptation arose early for 
a producer of goods to simply apply the trademark of a better known, 
more successful producer on his or her own goods in order to increase 
sales. To protect against this falsehood, many societies enacted laws 
prohibiting the copying of established trademarks.10  
Prior to the mid-20th century in the United States, trademark law was 
 
 5. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127; KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 
111, 115 (2004). The term “service mark” is specifically used to describe a trademark that identifies the 
source of a service. However, the terms “trademark” and in short, “mark,” encompass trademarks, 
service marks, brand names, trade dress, certification marks, and collective marks. Protecting Your 
Trademark: Enhancing Your Rights Through Federal Registration, United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, https://goo.gl/VPZNkW (last visited Feb. 7, 2018); William M. Borchard, A Trademark is Not a 
Copyright or a Patent 1, 3 (2014).  
 6. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., 543 U.S. at 115.  
 7. Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks – Their Early History, 59 Trademark Reporter 551, 552 
(1969); Samuel Birch, History of Ancient Pottery: Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, Etruscan, and Roman, 12, 
17, 2nd ed. (1873).  
 8. Id.  
 9. Paster, supra note 7. 
 10. In France, holders of infringed trademarks were entitled to civil remedies as early as the 
thirteenth century. Id. at 557. In other areas during the Middle Ages, trademark infringement was 
criminalized; sometimes rising to the level of felony. Id. 
2
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embedded almost entirely in common law.11 Under common law, an 
individual earned the exclusive right to a trademark simply by using it.12 
This right was geographically-dependent, meaning it was applicable 
only within the territory the mark was used so it would expand and 
shrink according to the region served by the trademark holder’s 
business.13 In addition to the common law, many states also enacted 
statutes governing trademark registration and protection.14 Ultimately, in 
1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act,15 creating a federal source of 
trademark law and protection. In sum, trademarks may be recognized 
and protectable via common law, state law, federal law, or some 
combination of the three.  
Through the Lanham Act, Congress constructed a national system of 
trademark registration16 and created federal rights of action against 
trademark infringement17 among many other provisions generally 
governing trademark law. Federal registration under the Lanham Act is 
not mandatory,18 but it affords several advantages to the trademark 
holder. Federal trademark registration provides notice to the public 
regarding the trademark holder’s official ownership of the mark.19 
Additionally, while a trademark holder is still required to enforce their 
own rights to using their mark, a legal presumption of valid mark 
ownership is created in all states through federal registration.20  
Notably, § 1052 of the Lanham Act applies a series of limitations to 
the subject matter that is eligible for trademark registration and 
protection under federal law. The initial limitation, known as the 
 
 11. Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Concepts of Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 5 TRADEMARK 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7, 21 (2013). Congress enacted several 
statutes in the 1870s to allow individuals to register their trademarks with the United States Patent 
Office and receive federal trademark rights, as well as to provide causes of action against infringement 
of registered trademarks. 16 Stat. 198; 19 Stat. 141. However, in 1879, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held this statute unconstitutional in the famous “Trade-Mark Cases.” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 
82, 99 (1879).  
 12. Ginsburg, supra note 11; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.  
 13. Ginsburg, supra note 11; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.  
 14. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1329.54 et seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.560 et seq.; Ind. Code. Ann. § 
5-28-39-1 et seq.  
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.  
 16. However, note that registration is not a prerequisite to receive trademark protection. Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“. . . it is common ground that § 43(a) 
protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for 
registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an 
unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).”). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq. 
 18. Trademark Basics, United States Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://goo.gl/fBKQCo (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
3
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Disparagement Clause (“Section 2(a)”), prohibits trademarks that 
“[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or 
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with 
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or 
bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”21  
To determine whether a trademark is disparaging, the examining 
attorney for the patent and trademark office employs a two-part test. 
First, the examiner assesses “the likely meaning of the matter in 
question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the 
relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of 
the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the 
marketplace in connection with the goods or services.”22 Next, the 
examiner determines “[i]f that meaning is found to refer to identifiable 
persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning 
may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced 
group.”23  
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act stood for nearly 70 years, and many 
disparaging terms were denied federal trademark registration.24 At one 
of arguably the most extremes in 1999, an individual was able to 
establish standing to oppose O.J. Simpson’s trademark registrations of 
O.J. SIMPSON, O.J., and THE JUICE solely by arguing that “as a 
Christian, family man,” the marks were offensive to him because they 
were synonymous with a “wife-beater and wife-murderer.”25 Several 
years later, the state of Section 2(a) swung to the complete opposite 
extreme in the cornerstone case for this article: Matal v. Tam.26  
B. In re Tam 
Enter Simon Tam, an Asian-American musician and activist from San 
Diego, California. Tam witnessed “the power of language” at an early 
 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  
 22. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1203.03(b)(i), https://goo.gl/Zzfz8E (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2018).  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Geller v. PTO, 135 S. Ct. 944 (2015), cert. 
denied (affirmed the registration refusal of the mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA 
under Section 2(a)).  
 25. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff’s 
opposition to Simpson’s marks have a “reasonable basis in fact” and remanded for further proceedings). 
Simpson eventually abandoned his trademark registration applications. Christina Mitropoulos, American 
Trademark Story: Ritchie v. Simpson, The George Washington University Law School Intellectual 
Property and Entertainment Law Brief (2016), https://goo.gl/qsqbsh.  
 26. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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age.27 In an opinion piece published in The New York Times, Tam 
described experiencing race-based torment by other children, being 
called racial and ethnic slurs such as “gook” and “Jap.”28 At only eleven 
years of age, the young Tam defiantly “threw back, ‘I’m a chink, get it 
right.’”29 Through this act of defiance, Tam aimed to expressly claim his 
own identity and to spin the negative words being used by others into a 
positive part of his identity.30  
In 2006, Tam founded an all Asian-American dance rock band in 
Portland, Oregon.31 When the time arrived to choose a name for the 
band, Tam solicited ideas from friends by asking about common 
stereotypes of Asian-Americans.32 Tam’s friends commonly responded 
that individuals of Asian descent stereotypically have “slanted eyes.”33 
Thus, he named the band The Slants “in order to ‘reclaim’ the term and 
drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons.”34 
Tam and The Slants popularity grew. They began to tour “the 
country, promoting social justice, playing anime conventions, raising 
money for charities and fighting stereotypes about Asian-Americans by 
playing bold music.”35 Then in 2010, Tam learned that some fans had 
accidentally purchased tickets for another band also with the name The 
Slants.36 So to avoid the continuance of this problem, Tam sought 
trademark registration for the name in 2011.37 Accordingly, Tam filed 
an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO).38 
In 2012, the PTO issued a refusal to Tam’s trademark registration 
application on the basis of the Disparagement Clause found in Section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding that the mark “consists of or includes 
matter which may disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute persons, 
institutions, beliefs or national symbols.”39 Specifically, the examining 
attorney of the PTO refused the application on the grounds that “THE 
 
 27. Simon Tam, The Slants on the Power of Repurposing a Slur, The New York Times (June 23, 
2017), https://goo.gl/JYVRXA.  
 28. Id.; “Gook” and “Jap” are derogatory terms aimed at individuals of Korean and Japanese 
descent or ethnicity.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Kat Chow, What's Next for The Founder of The Slants, And the Fight Over Racial Slurs, 
NPR (July 6, 2017 at 6:00 AM ET), https://goo.gl/a5rgEU (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).  
 33. Id.  
 34. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017).  
 35. Tam, supra note 27.  
 36. Chow, supra note 32.  
 37. THE SLANTS, FEDTM 85472044.  
 38. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 *1 (TTAB 2013).  
 39. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  
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SLANTS is a highly disparaging reference to people of Asian descent, 
that it retains this meaning when used in connection with the applicant’s 
services, and that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it 
to be disparaging.”40 Applying the requisite two-part test under Section 
2(a), the PTO examiner argued that use of The Slants was meant to be 
derogatory.41 Further, the examiner found that a substantial composite of 
people find the term offensive.42 
Tam appealed directly to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(TTAB), the administrative board of the PTO to which initial appeals of 
trademark registration decisions are made.43 Tam argued that the 
examiners “improperly condition registration on the ethnic background 
of an applicant,” and that specifically, “based on the examining 
attorney’s logic, non-Asians would be entitled to registration of the 
word ‘slants’ but Asians are not.”44 Despite Tam’s clear expression of 
his goal to reclaim the stereotype and weaken the derogatory force of the 
slur The Slants, the TTAB affirmed the refusal of Tam’s registration 
application.45 Notably, the TTAB emphasized that the USPTO’s refusal 
to register Tam’s mark in no way affected Tam’s right to use The Slants 
as his band name.46 Specifically, the TTAB characterized such refusal as 
unrelated to Tam’s First Amendment rights to free speech and 
expression because “[n]o conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of 
expression is suppressed,” but rather the restriction only implicates the 
availability of federal government resources in assisting with enforcing 
the applicant’s mark.47 
Tam then filed another appeal in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, whose jurisdiction applied under § 1295.48 While 
maintaining his previous arguments, Tam also challenged the 
constitutionality of Section 2(a) on the grounds that the restriction on 
disparaging trademarks violate the First Amendment, directly attacking 
the TTAB’s point of distinction in earlier proceedings.49  
In April 2015, the three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit expanded 
upon the TTAB’s point of distinction to some extent, holding that 
refusal of the registration as disparaging was within the discretion of the 
 
 40. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 at *2-*3.  
 41. Id. at *16.  
 42. Id. at *23-*24.  
 43. About the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
https://goo.gl/mBu9Ya (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
 44. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 at *9-*10.  
 45. Id. at *25.  
 46. Id. at *24.  
 47. Id. 
 48. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 49. Id. at 571.  
6
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PTO, and that such refusal under Section 2(a) does not violate the 
Constitution because: (1) denial of the registration does not prohibit use 
of the mark;50 (2) Section 2(a)’s ban of disparaging trademarks was 
sufficiently precise so as not to be void for vagueness;51 (3) the process 
of applying for registration met standards of due process;52 and (4) equal 
protection was not violated because the registration refusal was based on 
disparagement rather than race.53 
However, a sua sponte request for the case to be reheard en banc was 
granted, and so the initial Federal Circuit opinion was vacated, and 
Tam’s appeal was resurrected.54 Judge Kimberly Moore delivered the 
majority opinion for the twelve-judge panel, which then vacated the 
TTAB’s holding, finding that Section 2(a) is an unconstitutional 
violation of the First Amendment and remanding for further 
proceedings.55 Notably, the Federal Circuit limited the parties briefs to 
solely the issue of First Amendment implication in Section 2(a)’s bar on 
registration of disparaging trademarks, highlighting that the TTAB’s 
outright rejection of a First Amendment implication, at the very least, 
did not employ as thorough of an analysis as necessary.56 
C. Matal v. Tam  
Less than five months after the en banc Federal Circuit’s opinion, the 
PTO petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to review the 
Federal Circuit’s invalidation of Section 2(a) as unconstitutional.57 By 
Fall 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.58 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s finding that 
Section 2(a) is an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment, but 
significant questions remain.59  
First, the Court held that Section 2(a) applies to trademarks that 
disparage members of a race or ethnicity.60 Section 2(a) provided that 
federal trademark registration was unavailable to marks that “disparage 
or falsely suggest a connection with persons.“61 Tam argued that the 
 
 50. Id. at 572 (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (Cust. & Pat. App 1981)).  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 573-74.  
 53. Id. at 573.  
 54. In re Shiao Tam, 600 Fed. Appx. 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 55. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 56. Id. at 1334. The Federal Circuit also received ten amicus briefs on the same issue.  
 57. Lee v. Shiao Tam, 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1726 (2016).  
 58. Lee v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 30 (2016).  
 59. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).  
 60. Id. at 1756.  
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
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definition of the term “persons,” as used in Section 2(a), extended only 
to “natural and juristic persons” and did not include “non-juristic entities 
such as racial and ethnic groups.”62 Tam pointed to the definition of 
“person” included in the Lanham Act, which provided that “[i]n the 
construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from 
the context . . . [t]he term ‘person’ and any other word or term used to 
designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or 
rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic 
person as well as a natural person.”63 The Court found that a plain 
meaning of the text refuted Tam’s argument because Section 2(a) 
prohibited marks that disparage “persons” and the disparagement of a 
racial group certainly disparages persons included in that racial group.64  
Tam also turned to the history of the enforcement of Section 2(a) to 
support his narrow construction of the term “persons” in Section 2(a).65 
He contended that for many years, the PTO allowed registration of 
“marks that plainly denigrated African-Americans and Native 
Americans.”66 However, the Supreme Court found this point 
unpersuasive, stating that the PTO’s early practice of Section 2(a) was 
“unenlightening” because the vagueness of the provision has “produced 
a haphazard record of enforcement.”67 
The majority then addressed whether Section 2(a) violated the First 
Amendment, specifically addressing three arguments by the government 
to overcome First Amendment violation.68 The government argued that 
trademark registration is government speech or commercial speech, not 
pure private speech, and therefore, First Amendment restraints do not 
apply.69 Additionally, the government argued that federal trademark 
registration was a government subsidy, and if not, then Section 2(a) 
should be analyzed under a new “government-program” doctrine.70 
The Court rejected the argument that federal trademark registration 
constitutes government speech, finding that the actual marks being 
registered by the PTO, a government agency, were not created by the 
government, did not convey a government message, and the public did 
 
 62. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1755.  
 63. Id. at 1755; 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127.  
 64. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1756.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017).  
 67. Id. at 1756-57.  
 68. Id. at 1757.  
 69. Id.; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005); Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 
529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000). 
 70. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757. 
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not associate the mark with the government.71 Because federal 
trademark registration did not constitute government speech, First 
Amendment protections apply.  
The government also argued that trademark registration is 
commercial speech.72 The basis of trademark rights exist in their use in 
commerce and the purpose of trademarks are to distinguish between 
sources of goods and services. Even if federal trademark registration 
was commercial speech, the Court found that Section 2(a) would fail the 
appropriate First Amendment analysis.73 To assess whether the First 
Amendment has been violated in the context of commercial speech, the 
restriction on speech must be narrowly drawn to serve a substantial 
interest.74 The Court held that at best, the government’s most substantial 
interest involved insulating the “orderly flow of commerce from 
disruption caused by trademarks that support invidious 
discrimination.”75 But most likely, the purpose of Section 2(a) was to 
prevent offensive speech, which “strikes at the heart of the First 
Amendment.”76 Further, the Court held that prohibiting any trademark 
that disparages any person or group could not be narrowly drawn, and 
therefore violates the First Amendment.  
The government argued that Section 2(a) constitutes a government 
subsidy, and therefore First Amendment protections do not apply.77 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has held that the “government is not 
required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to promote.”78 
Under this argument, if federal trademark registration were to be 
considered a government subsidy, the government would be afforded 
deference free from First Amendment protections in choosing which 
trademarks to register and which to deny. However, the Supreme Court 
also rejected this argument, finding a clear distinction from cases 
involving government subsidy questions, all of which involved direct 
monetary subsidies.79 In federal trademark registration, the PTO does 
not provide payment to applicants seeking registration, but rather 
 
 71. Id. at 1760.  
 72. Id. at 1764.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 75. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1749.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1760.  
 78. Id. (citing Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)).  
 79. Id.; Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 118 S. 
Ct. 2168 (1998); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003). 
9
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collects money from applicants in exchange for review.80 
Finally, the government proposed a novel “government-program 
doctrine” for First Amendment analysis.81 This proposed doctrine would 
merge the analyses and precedent from government speech First 
Amendment case law and government subsidy case law.82 This would 
ultimately afford the government more deference in refusing registration 
based on content or based on speaker.83 The Court expressly rejected 
such a doctrine on the grounds that this would allow for vast viewpoint 
discrimination, and viewpoint discrimination is expressly forbidden.84  
With all three of the government’s arguments failing, the Court 
ultimately held that Section 2(a) was an unconstitutional abridgement of 
an applicant’s First Amendment right to free speech and expression by 
limiting the scope of marks available for federal trademark registration 
on the grounds of disparagement.85  
III. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND EARLY 
APPLICATIONS OF MATAL V. TAM 
While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Matal v. Tam may seem direct 
on its face, many questions remain as to the effect of the overturning of 
Section 2(a). This section will discuss major points of uncertainty and 
potential implications that arise therefrom. First, using the case of In re 
Brunetti as context, this section will address whether the analysis in Tam 
regarding Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause should apply similarly to 
its “immoral or scandalous” provision. Next, this section will argue that 
Section 2(a) may not be as clear of a First Amendment issue as the Tam 
Court conveyed, and at most, Section 2(a) is an indirect restriction of an 
applicant’s First Amendment right to free speech and expression. 
Finally, this section will discuss an early application of the Tam holding 
and analysis out of the Second Circuit in Wandering Dago v. Destito,86 
and explain why the First Amendment implications were much more 
concrete in that case than in Tam despite the clear similarities.  
 
 80. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1761. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1761-62.  
 83. Id. at 1763. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See id.  
 86. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 28 (2nd Cir. 2018). 
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A. Unanswered questions 
1. Section 2(a)’s “immoral and scandalous” provision should be 
interpreted similarly to the disparagement clause.  
The majority in Matal v. Tam clearly determined that Section 2(a)’s 
prohibition of disparaging trademarks constitutes unconstitutional 
viewpoint-based discrimination by the government. However, the Court 
narrowly applied this analysis to only the provision of Section 2(a) 
prohibiting trademarks that “may disparage . . . persons, living or 
dead.”87 This leaves unanswered whether refusal of other types of 
trademarks prohibited by Section 2(a) should be treated likewise 
because Section 2(a) does not limit the prohibition to only disparaging 
trademarks. Rather, Section 2(a) in its entirety also prohibits registration 
of trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral . . . or scandalous 
matter.”88  
Notably, Justice Kennedy explained that the majority did not address 
First Amendment implications of the other provisions of the Lanham 
Act.89 Disparaging trademarks are one of a handful of grounds for 
registration refusal found in 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Others include marks 
featuring the flag of any country or state, marks using an individual’s 
name without their consent, and descriptive or deceptively 
misdescriptive marks.90  
Around the time that Simon Tam brought the issue of 
constitutionality of the prohibition of disparaging trademarks to the 
Federal Circuit, Erik Brunetti raised a similar constitutional argument 
against Section 2(a)’s “immoral and scandalous” clause. While the 
resulting court decisions were pending, the USPTO placed a hold on the 
examination of registration applications for trademarks implicating 
Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause or immoral and scandalous clause.91 
Following the decision in Matal v. Tam, the USPTO issued guidance 
stating that it was lifting the suspensions on applications for trademarks 
implicating Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause or immoral and 
 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
 88. Section 2(a) provides several other provisions primarily prohibiting deceptive trademarks. 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(a). Because the primary purpose of trademarks is to distinguish between the sources of 
goods, prohibitions against deceptive marks certainly qualifies as a substantial government interest to 
justify registration refusal. For this reason, those provisions will not be discussed here. 
 89. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1768.  
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.  
 91. John L. Welch, USPTO Exam Guide 2-18: Scandalousness Refusals on Hold Pending Final 
Resolution of In re Brunetti, The TTABlog (May 31, 2018), https://goo.gl/PGDpsS (last visited Oct. 22, 
2018). 
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scandalous clause.92 However, the Court in Tam provided no guidance 
on whether Section 2(a)’s immoral and scandalous clause suffered from 
the same First Amendment defect as its disparagement clause.  
In December 2017, the Federal Circuit answered this question in the 
affirmative in In re Brunetti.93 Erik Brunetti applied to register the 
trademark FUCT for his clothing brand, but the examining attorney 
rejected Brunetti’s application, finding that when FUCT is spoken aloud 
it sounds similar to the word “fucked” and Section 2(a) prohibits 
registration of trademarks comprising immoral or scandalous matter.94  
Brunetti appealed to the TTAB, but the appellate board affirmed the 
decision after consulting references such as Urban Dictionary95 and 
Google Images, which associated the term “fuct” with vulgar material.96 
Specifically, the TTAB found that Brunetti’s use of the term would 
create inferences of “strong and often explicit, sexual imagery that 
objectifies women and offers degrading examples of nihilism.”97  
The Federal Circuit recognized that the TTAB correctly held that the 
mark was immoral or scandalous, but held that the TTAB wrongfully 
ruled that the mark was ineligible for registration because Section 2(a)’s 
“bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional 
restriction of free speech.”98 The government’s position was that refusal 
of Brunetti’s trademark was warranted, primarily contending that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Tam only applies when Section 2(a) 
implicates viewpoint discrimination, and therefore, is not applicable to 
the prohibition of immoral or scandalous trademarks, which is viewpoint 
neutral.99  
The Federal Circuit refused to address whether the immoral or 
scandalous provision of Section 2(a) is viewpoint neutral, but ruled that 
regardless, it is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech 
for which the government has no adequate interest.100 The Supreme 
Court in Tam did not directly address the immoral and scandalous 
provision, but the Brunetti Court still argued that the Tam decision 
 
 92. Trademark Examination Guides, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
https://goo.gl/Nq65cp (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).  
 93. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 94. Id. at 1337. 
 95. Urban Dictionary, https://www.urbandictionary.com/, (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
 96. In re Brunetti, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 328 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd., 2014).  
 97. Id. at *11. 
 98. Id. However, if the government’s intent is that a mark such as FUCT be unregistrable, an 
avenue may exist. Congress could amend Section 2(a) to prohibit federal trademark registration for 
obscene marks since the First Amendment traditionally has been interpreted to not protect obscenity. 
Federal Circuit Court Justice Dyk highlighted this path being available to the government in his 
concurring opinion in Brunetti. 877 at 1358 (J. Dyk, concurring).  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 1351-52. 
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supports a finding that protecting the public from offensive marks is an 
inadequate interest to justify speech restriction.101 Writing for the 
majority in Tam, Justice Alito asserted that restriction for being 
offensive “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle.”102 Similarly, 
in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he reported the Court’s long 
history of precluding the government from identifying the offensive 
nature of speech as a justification for restriction.103 Additionally, the 
Brunetti Court pointed to the long-standing uncertainty with how the 
USPTO has applied the immoral or scandalous provision, noting that it 
allowed registration for some immoral or scandalous marks, such as 
MUTHA EFFIN BINGO,104 FUGLY,105 and FAT MILF,106 but refused 
registration for others, including NO $#!+, NO BS ZONE, and MILF 
MANIA.107 
Because the Federal Circuit employed such a similar analysis in 
Brunetti as the Supreme Court did in Tam, it’s likely that the Federal 
Circuit Brunetti decision will remain the highest authority on the issue 
of First Amendment analysis regarding Section 2(a)’s immoral or 
scandalous provision. The Supreme Court in Tam indeed failed to take 
advantage of the opportunity to provide the most authoritative and clear 
answer on this topic, but that should have little impact. The Federal 
Circuit’s Brunetti analysis and holding is clearly consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling and it would be unlikely for the Supreme Court 
to grant certiorari only to end up affirming the decision outright. 
2. Is this really a Free Speech issue? 
A significant question remains apparent: is Section 2(a) even a First 
Amendment issue? Of course, the restriction set forth in Section 2(a) 
must have some level of First Amendment implication or it would not 
have played such a major role in many levels of the Tam proceedings. 
However, the extent to which Section 2(a) truly constitutes an 
abridgement of an applicant’s First Amendment right to free speech and 
expression is not as concrete as the Supreme Court laid it out to be.  
As the TTAB emphasized in earlier proceedings, the refusal of the 
PTO to register an applicant’s trademark does not involve the 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). Justice Alito later cited twelve Supreme Court 
cases striking down the government’s restrictions aimed at offensive speech. Id. at 1763.  
 103. Id. at 1767.  
 104. MUTHA EFFIN BINGO, Reg. No. 4,183,272. 
 105. FUGLY, Reg. No. 5,135,615.  
 106. FAT MILF, Reg. No. 3,372,094. 
 107. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d. 1330, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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government restricting the applicant from using that particular mark, but 
rather it’s the government refusing to grant the applicant a monopoly on 
using the mark in commerce and the availability of federal government 
resources to assist in enforcing a trademark holder’s right to their 
federally registered trademarks. Federal trademark registration may 
provide additional favorable protections to a trademark from that 
afforded at common law.108 However, federal trademark registration is 
not a prerequisite to the ability to use a mark, nor is it a prerequisite for 
a mark to be afforded protections.109 Likewise, refusal of registration by 
the PTO is not equivalent to the PTO proscribing an applicant from 
using the mark moving forward.  
In effect, Simon Tam still had the ability to use the name THE 
SLANTS despite the initial rejection of his federal trademark 
registration application. Tam’s mark simply wouldn’t be afforded the 
same protections that a federally registered mark would receive. This 
doesn’t necessarily mean that Tam’s mark would receive no protections 
as it may very well have warranted protections available via the 
common law. Essentially, by denying federal trademark registration, the 
government is not restricting Tam’s speech because it wouldn’t have 
precluded him from using the mark, and therefore wouldn’t have 
restricted his speech outright.  
However, a more nuanced approach to analyzing the role that the 
First Amendment plays in assessing the constitutionality of Section 2(a) 
reveals that barring federal trademark registration for disparaging, 
immoral, or scandalous terms undoubtedly approaches free speech and 
expression. While they may not directly proscribe an individual using a 
particular term as their mark, Section 2(a)’s prohibitions create a 
chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression. Essentially, not 
affording federal registration effectively forces self-censorship by 
applicants. For example, if an applicant has an expressive trademark that 
approaches the concept of disparaging, or immoral, or scandalous, he or 
she may choose to revise their mark in favor of a safer mark. In this 
situation, the government has, in effect, suppressed that applicants First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression. However, this 
restriction would be completely indirect because the applicant would 
still have the ability to use the mark, just not the ability to register the 
mark with the federal government.  
Remarkably, an argument can be made that federal trademark 
registration imparts a much more concrete First Amendment restriction 
on individuals not applying for trademarks than on the applicants 
 
 108. See supra section II(a). 
 109. Id. 
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themselves. By granting the registration of a trademark, the government 
effectively prohibits the speech of individuals other than the trademark 
holder. Granting an applicant’s federal trademark registration 
application undeniably results in a restriction placed on others from 
using the applicant’s mark, or else they face liability to the trademark 
holder for trademark infringement. This restriction effectuates the social 
justice theory offered by Tam and Tam’s supporters of “taking back” 
disparaging terms such as THE SLANTS in order to weaken their 
derogatory force. In theory, having virtuous individuals granted the 
exclusive right to use a derogatory term or slur in commerce as a 
trademark would then prohibit hateful individuals from potentially 
profiting off such a term when using them in malicious manners. 
B. Wandering Dago:110 an example of rightfully applying the Tam First 
Amendment analysis to a non-trademark government registration 
program.  
Questions have risen as to whether the holding in Tam applies to 
government registration or licensure programs outside of the area of 
trademark law. The decision in Tam obviously creates repercussions in 
trademark law: registration applications for disparaging terms are likely 
to increase significantly.111 Following Brunetti, where the Federal 
Circuit applied analysis consistent with Tam, registration applications 
for immoral or scandalous terms are likely to increase as well. However, 
Tam’s implications may result in a much broader change than solely that 
seen in trademark law. As evidenced by early applications of the Tam 
decision, courts have applied a similar First Amendment approach in 
other areas of the law involving a denial of government registration 
based on ethnic-slur branding.112 
This line of inquiry arose during the earlier Tam proceedings 
themselves as the TTAB addressed the issue of whether First 
Amendment analysis applied to Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause. 
The TTAB justified the initial rejection of Tam’s application by 
emphasizing that the refusal of registration only applied to Tam’s right 
to register the term THE SLANTS but does not affect his right to use the 
term.113. Following this argument, Tam’s First Amendment right to free 
speech and expression was not suppressed because his speech was not 
actually restricted. On the same note, the government argued that 
 
 110. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 28 (2nd Cir. 2018). 
 111. As previously mentioned, in the period following the Supreme Court’s decision in Matal v. 
Tam, applications to register trademarks for disparaging terms noticeably increased.  
 112. Wandering Dago, 879 F.3d at 28. 
 113. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 *1 (TTAB 2013). 
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trademark registration is a government subsidy, and so First Amendment 
analysis would not apply.114 However, the Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that federal trademark registration is a government subsidy 
program and applied First Amendment analysis separate from a body of 
case law involving government subsidies accordingly.115  
In addressing the government’s litany of contentions that trademark 
registration was a government subsidy, or that trademark registration 
should be analyzed under a novel “government-program doctrine,” the 
Court acknowledged that “[t]rademark registration is not the only 
government registration scheme.”116 In fact, many forms of government 
registration exist, including copyrights and patents at the federal level, 
and driver’s licenses or hunting permits at the state level. Despite this 
acknowledgement, the Court did not state, or even suggest, that the Tam 
analysis and holding applied to all government registration programs, 
and not just trademark registration. Even further, cases involving these 
government subsidy programs on which the government relied were 
deemed to be entirely unhelpful in terms of assessing the 
constitutionality of speech restrictions imposed with the government 
program.117 Nonetheless, recent cases suggest that the Tam holding has 
already impacted non-trademark government registration programs.  
In 2013, two food truck owners, Andrea Loguidice and Brandon 
Snooks, operating their food truck under the brand Wandering Dago 
(“WD”), sought a permit from the New York State Office of General 
Services (“OGS”), which requires vendors selling food on the Empire 
State Plaza in Albany, NY to obtain a permit.118 OGS rejected WD’s 
permit application on the grounds that their name was an offensive 
ethnic slur for individuals of Italian descent, and that the names of the 
sandwiches they served involved other ethnic slurs.119 Like Simon Tam, 
the WD operators saw their use of the slurs as “giving a ‘nod to [their] 
Italian heritage’ and to their ancestors.”120 By using these slurs, they 
believed that they were conveying to other immigrants a welcoming 
message and that they were weakening the derogatory impact that the 
slurs may have.121 Accordingly, WD brought suit alleging that OGS 
violated its First Amendment rights to free speech by rejecting the 
 
 114. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017).  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 28 (2nd Cir. 2018).  
 119. Id. Other slurs used included "Dago," "Castro," "American Idiot," "Goombah," "Guido," 
"Polack," "El Guapo," and "KaSchloppas." 
 120. Id. at 25.  
 121. Id.  
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application on the basis of using ethnic slurs for branding purposes.122 
Citing Tam in their analysis, the Second Circuit held that the rejection 
of WD’s use of ethnic slurs as branding in this case amounted to a 
viewpoint and the rejection of WD’s permit application on the basis of 
using those ethnic slurs amounted to viewpoint-based restriction—thus, 
the denial was an unconstitutional abridgement of WD’s First 
Amendment rights to free speech.123 However, the First Amendment 
issues are much more applicable in the case of Wandering Dago. Denial 
of WD’s right to use their branding in the plaza, on the basis of the 
words used in their branding, is an outright restriction of WD’s ability to 
use the terms, and therefore a direct restriction of free speech and 
expression.  
Conversely, in Tam, even after the USPTO denied Simon Tam federal 
trademark registration for the band name THE SLANTS, he still could 
have used that mark as a band name wherever he saw fit, just without 
the mark being registered federally. The vital point of distinction is that 
Simon Tam would not have been prohibited from using his speech, 
whereas Wandering Dago would have been prohibited from selling their 
food from their food truck at the plaza without the requisite permit. 
Ultimately, this point of distinction conveys an explanation as to why 
the Tam First Amendment analysis is more appropriate in Wandering 
Dago and other government registration cases where speech is actually 
restricted, than it is in the case of Tam itself.  
C. No matter the level of First Amendment involvement, Section 2(a) 
does not survive even rational basis review. 
After several contentions from the government and subsequent 
lengthy discussions regarding what type of speech restriction Section 
2(a) involves, the Court ultimately determined that Section 2(a)’s 
disparagement clause constituted unconstitutional viewpoint-based 
restriction on private speech.124 The government contended that federal 
trademark registration was a form of government speech, because the 
First Amendment does not regulate government speech, and so the 
government would not be required to remain viewpoint-neutral in its 
own speech.125 However, Justice Alito noted that “affixing a government 
seal of approval” does not alone constitute speech made by the 
government, and so the USPTO registering a trademark created by a 
 
 122. Id. at 29.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2017).  
 125. Id. at 1757; (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“[t]he Free 
Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech”). 
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private actor could not constitute speech made by the government.126 
Outside of government speech, regardless of the category of First 
Amendment restriction that Section 2(a) falls into, the government 
would have to provide a sufficient justification in order for the 
restriction to be upheld as constitutional.127 The only legitimate 
justification that could be provided by the government for the 
prohibition against federal trademark registration for disparaging, 
immoral, or scandalous terms is to protect the public from being 
subjected to offensive terms and ideas. However, there is a long-
standing history of the Supreme Court rejecting protection against 
offensive ideas as a justification for First Amendment restrictions. 
Justice Alito cites twelve cases alone in support of this continuous 
rejection.128 No matter how direct or indirect, or concrete or nebulous, 
the implication of the First Amendment under Section 2(a), the 
government could not have provided a substantial justification to allow 
Section 2(a) to remain constitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Several ambiguities remain following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Matal v. Tam. However, some of the answers may be becoming 
apparent through early applications of the Tam holding. Adherence to 
Tam by the Federal Circuit in In re Brunetti strongly suggests that the 
prohibition against federal trademark registration of immoral or 
scandalous terms as set forth by Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act should 
undoubtedly be afforded the same analysis as Section 2(a)’s provision 
proscribing federal trademark registration of disparaging terms. 
Accordingly, the immoral or scandalous provision suffers from the exact 
same First Amendment fate as the disparagement clause—an 
unconstitutional restriction placed on the applicant’s right to free speech 
and expression.  
Even more broadly, however, Matal v. Tam suggests that the 
government may violate an individual’s First Amendment right to free 
speech and expression even when it does not place a restriction on the 
 
 126. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758. 
 127. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 
557 (1980).  
 128. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); 
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969); Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963); 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); 
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 
365 (1937). 
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speech or expression outright. Federal trademark registration does not 
grant a trademark holder the right to use a term in commerce, nor does 
refusal of federal trademark registration preclude that individual from 
using the term. Because of this, no speech or expression is directly 
suppressed by Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibited the 
federal registration of disparaging terms as trademarks.  
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